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International Products Liability and Long-Arm
Jurisdiction:
Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc.
Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc. I raises the issue of the scope of Arkansas'
long-arm statute in securing in personam jurisdiction over a foreign dis-
tributor of defective products. The increasing volume of products im-
ported into the United States has created a vital need for its citizens to
recover damages for injuries suffered from defective products. However,
in Hutson, the Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit refused to expand the
use of Arkansas' long-arm statute to assert jurisdiction over a foreign dis-
tributor of products sold within the state.
The plaintiffs in Hutson, two lumber yard employees, were injured
when a chain that their employer purchased from a local retailer broke.
The chain was manufactured by an unknown Yugoslavian company and
purchased by Acciaiere Weissenfels, an Italian corporation. Weissenfels
repackaged the chain and sold it as its own product to Frank Fehr &
Company, a British corporation that had exclusive rights to sell Weis-
senfels products in the United States. Fehr & Company resold the chain
to its New York subsidiary, Fehr Brothers, which repackaged it under its
own brand name, Fairine, and sold it to the Arkansas retailer, Carroll
Building and Appliance Company.2
Plaintiffs, Arkansas residents, brought a products liability action
against Weissenfels and Fehr Brothers in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Arkansas. Weissenfels moved to dismiss the action
for lack of jurisdiction. The court denied Weissenfels' motion, holding
that the state's long-arm statute permitted in personam jurisdiction for
tortious acts committed outside Arkansas that caused injury in Arkansas.
The district court also found that the exercise of in personam jurisdiction
over Weissenfels was consistent with the constitutional due process re-
quirements established in International Shoe v. Washington3 and Hanson v.
Denckla.4 The minimum contacts test of International Shoe was satisfied
since Weissenfels, even though two steps removed from the forum state,
had received "substantial revenue" from sales totaling $74,551.35 in Ar-
kansas by Fehr Brothers over a four-year period. Furthermore, the court
1 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978).
2 Id at 834-35.
3 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4 357 U.S. 325 (1958).
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held that Weissenfels had purposely availed itself of the privilege of con-
ducting business in Arkansas, as required by Hanson, in that it was a
foreseeable result of Weissenfels' distribution system that some chains
would be sold in Arkansas. 5
At defendants' request, the district court certified the issue of juris-
diction for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed in a
three to two decision. The court of appeals found that Arkansas' long-
arm statute was sufficiently broad to reach the tortious activity, but held
that the assertion of in personam jurisdiction over Weissenfels would be
violative of constitutional due process requirements.6 The plaintiff's pe-
tition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied. 7
The majority in Hutson acknowledged that some courts have exer-
cised jurisdiction over any corporation that introduces its product into
the stream of interstate commerce if it had reason to know or expect that
its product would be brought into the state where the injury occurred.
They rejected a mechanical application of this foreseeability test as in-
compatible with due process rights. The court refocused on International
Shoe's requirement that the "quality and nature" of the defendant's ac-
tivity be such that it is reasonable and fair to subject a defendant to suit
in the forum state."
Although the court never specifically addressed the question, it ap-
pears that the dispositive issue in Hutson for the majority was whether
Weissenfels was the manufacturer or merely a distributor of the defective
chain. The majority on the court must have concluded Weissenfels was
merely a distributor, because if it was deemed a manufacturer the great
weight of precedent supports a finding of jurisdiction.9 Courts have as-
serted jurisdiction where a foreign manufacturer is involved if the use of
the defective product in the forum state was foreseeable.' 0
After placing its products in the stream of commerce, courts have
not allowed a manufacturer to insulate itself from jurisdiction by creat-
ing a network of distributors. In Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke,1I
the defendant German proprietorship marketed, through a system of ex-
clusive distributorships, goods allegedly infringing on patents held by the
U.S. corporation. The court asserted jurisdiction over Metz, holding
that the international manufacturer should not be able to "insulate him-
self from the long-arm of the courts by an intermediary or by professing
5 584 F.2d at 838.
6 Id. at 835-36.
7 47 U.S.L.W. 3368 (1978).
8 584 F.2d at 836-37.
9 See cases cited in 19 A.L.R.3d 13, §§ 5(a), 8(a)-(d) (1968).
10 For example, in Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir.
1969), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an English manufacturer of alleg-
edly defective coach bodies was subject to Hawaii's jurisdiction because it knew that its prod-
uct's ultimate destination was Hawaii. This was sufficient to satisfy due process requirements
under Hawaii's long-arm statute.
1I 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975).
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ignorance of the ultimate destination of his products." 12
The New Jersey courts, faced with the same issue, held that their
long-arm statute was sufficiently broad to reach an international manu-
facturer who had no direct contacts with New Jersey. In Certismo v. Hei-
delberg13 the U.S. distributor of an allegedly defective printing press
sought to file a third-party complaint against the German manufacturer
in a products liability case. After admitting that the traditional bases of
jurisdiction, namely consent, presence and doing business, 14 were absent,
the court held that a manufacturer who placed his product into the
stream of commerce was subject to jurisdiction anywhere it was foresee-
able that the product would travel. 15
The court specifically addressed the issue of whether this connection
with a forum state was too tenuous to support in personam jurisdiction.
It held that the need of New Jersey citizens to have an accessible forum
outweighed the inconvenience to the defendant. "[T]o prevent recovery
by an injured plaintiff on third party plaintiff because the manufacturer
had no 'contacts' in that it handled all transactions through a middle-
man-distributor, is to allow a legal technicality to subvert justice and
economic reality in the worst sense."' 6
On appeal the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division,
declined to decide whether the stream of commerce rule conformed to
the requirements of due process.17 It affirmed the lowt-r court's jurisdic-
tion on the grounds that the distributor was "an integral spoke to a
wheel in which [the German Company] is the hub," and thus mainte-
nance of the suit did not offend traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice. '8
An argument can be made that obtaining jurisdiction over a corpo-
ration chartered in a foreign country should require more substantial
"minimum contacts" than a similar assertion of jurisdiction over a do-
mestic out-of-state corporation. In Seilon, Inc. v. Brema Sp.A. ,19 the court
was confronted with the issue of whether more contacts were required to
sustain jurisdiction over a corporate defendant chartered under the laws
of a foreign country. The court, without dealing with any of the peculiar
facts of the case, merely relied on a prior case that found no difference in
applicable standards for jurisdiction over interstate and international de-
12 Id at 1144.
13 298 A.2d 298 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972).
14 For an excellent discussion of the traditional bases of jurisdiction, see Kurland, The
Supreme Court, the Due Aocess Clause and the In Personam Jursdction of State Courts." From. Pennoyer to
Nef A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 578-86 (1958).
15 298 A.2d at 303.
16 Id at 304.
17 Van Eewen v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., 306 A.2d 79, 81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1973).
18 Id at 83 (quoting Hoagland v. Springer, 183 A.2d 678, 680 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1962)).
19 271 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
322 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
fendants. In the prior case, National Gas Apph'ance Corp. v. A.B. Elec-
trolux,20 a Swedish corporation was subjected to Illinois jurisdiction in an
action for breach of contract where the court found a substantial part of
the negotiations, conferences, contacts and meetings culminating in the
contract, took place in Illinois. 2 1 The court did not discuss any differen-
tiation in the amount or nature of the minimum contacts required be-
tween defendants chartered in another state and those chartered in
another country. Thus when the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue in
Hutson, there was no solid precedent for applying a more stringent mini-
mum contacts test in international cases than that used in interstate
cases.
A real difficulty underlying the early attempts to work out a satisfac-
tory rationale for personal jurisdiction was that the doctrines of "con-
sent" and "presence" were borrowed from laws relating to wholly
independent sovereignties which were not relevant to jurisdictions bound
together by a national government. 22 In International Shoe the Supreme
Court abandoned these tests and allowed states to extend their jurisdic-
tion to the full extent permitted by the due process clause. Judgments
issued against out-of-state defendants would be enforced in any state in
which the defendant had property under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Constitution. 23 When international parties are involved,
"Full Faith and Credit" is inapplicable for enforcement and the plaintiff
must rely on principles of international comity. Consequently, it is argu-
able that when international defendants are involved, courts should re-
turn to the traditional doctrines of jurisdiction between independent
sovereigns and find jurisdiction only where the forum has a more tradi-
tional "power" to support jurisdiction over the defendant. This power
might be the result of the defendant's contacts in the state, but would
necessarily be substantial contacts over which the state could exercise a
judgment.
Since the majority in Hutson found that Weissenfels was not the
manufacturer of the chain, the issue is whether a mere distributor should
be subject to jurisdiction in Arkansas. In product liability actions most
courts and the Restatement of Torts have held that strict liability is ap-
plicable to wholesalers or distributors regardless of whether the ultimate
consumer purchased the product directly from them or obtained it indi-
rectly further down the distribution chain.24 The cases refusing to apply
the strict liability doctrine to distributors generally involve situations in
which the manufacturer is reputable and reliable and the product is not
inspected or opened until purchased by the final consumer. This excep-
20 270 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1959).
21 Id at 475.
22 Kurland, supra note 14, at 578-84.
23 326 U.S. at 316.
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A; 13 A.L.R.3d 1096, § 10[a] (1967).
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tion would not apply in Hutson as Weissenfels opened and repackaged
the chain.
Despite the trend to hold even a mere distributor strictly liable for a
defective product, the majority in Hutson rejects a mechanical applica-
tion of the foreseeability test to determine whether to assert jurisdiction.
Paraphrasing the Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla, the majority
stated that it would examine the facts of the case to determine if enough
"affiliating circumstances" were present to warrant jurisdiction.2 5 In
Hanson the Supreme Court had recognized the trend towards expanding
personal jurisdiction over nonresidents due to technological progress
both increasing the need for states to provide a local forum for their citi-
zens and minimizing the burden to the defendant of defending an action
in a foreign tribunal.26 Yet the court stated that it would be incorrect to
assume that all restrictions on personal jurisdiction were disappearing.
The minimum contacts restriction was more than a shield against an
inconvenient or distant trial. It was based on the
[t]erritorial limitations of the power of the respective states. However
minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may
not be called upon to do so unless he has had the "minimal contacts"
with the state that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.
2 7
The majority in Hutson found Weissenfels' contacts with Arkansas con-
sisted of only the fortuitous introduction of products into the state by the
decision of the British corporation. Thus Weissenfels had not purposely
availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state.
As the product was not manufactured by Weissenfels or marketed or sold
by them in the United States, the court found that too few "affiliating
circumstances" were present to satisfy the minimum contacts necessary
for in personam jurisdiction.28 The court stated that considerations asso-
ciated with forum non conveniens and forum convenience were pertinent
to their decision and that subjecting Weissenfels to the burden of defend-
ing the suit in Arkansas would offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."'29
Two dissents to the majority opinion were filed. The first dissent,
authored by Judge Stephenson, emphasized Weissenfels' connection with
the chain itself. Fehr Brothers, Inc. circulated advertisements to Arkan-
sas consumers in which it was claimed that Weissenfels had been "pro-
ducing chains for over 500 years" and was a "pioneer in the
technological development of chain."' 30 The brochure stated that the
Weissenfels factory was equipped with the most modern machinery
available and staffed by "highly skilled workmen to whom chain making
25 584 F.2d at 837.
26 357 U.S. at 250-51.
27 Id at 251.
28 584 F.2d at 837.
29 Id
30 Id at 838.
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[was] a family tradition."'a The dissent thus treated Weissenfels as the
manufacturer of the chain and cited a line of cases in which courts had
asserted jurisdiction over alien manufacturers who sold their products
into the stream of commerce. Judge Stephenson argued that the use of a
foreseeability test was necessary to prevent a manufacturer from insulat-
ing himself from jurisdiction simply by adding a distributor to its sales
chain. This, he felt, would be fundamentally unfair.32
Judge Lay in a second dissent cited Arkansas authority to show that
the Supreme Court of Arkansas would have upheld jurisdiction over
Weissenfels. 33 According to Judge Lay, by denying jurisdiction, the ma-
jority in effect declared unconstitutional that part of the Arkansas long-
arm statute that authorized jurisdiction over a nonresident alien for torts
committed in the state. 34 Judge Lay felt that this encroached on the
state's prerogative of providing its citizens with a convenient forum for
addressing injuries and that it overlooked the sound judicial policy of
encouraging the settlement of all claims arising out of the same core of
operant facts in a single lawsuit. 3
5
Hutson points to a shift away from placing paramount emphasis on a
state's right to provide a convenient forum for its citizens and towards a
truer balance of convenience to both parties. This shift was evident in
Shafer v. Heitner36 when the Supreme Court ruled that in rem jurisdiction
could no longer be secured simply on the basis of the defendant owning
property in the forum state. The court held that in rem jurisdiction was
contingent on the existence of the same minimum contacts required for
in personam jurisdiction.3 7
The increase in foreign products entering the U.S. market makes it
desirable for a definitive statement on the extent of a state's right to
claim jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer and/or distributor. Hut-
son is not such a case. Hutson does reemphasize the due process require-
ment of fundamental fairness to both parties in the choice of a forum. It
does not address the issue of if, and to what degree, Weissenfels' foreign
nature increased the minimum contacts necessary to satisfy due process.
The courts already assert jurisdiction over international manufacturers
and over U.S. interstate distributors where the use of the product and
thus injury from it are foreseeable. It seems but a logical extension of
jurisdiction to next reach an international distributor for injuries occur-
ing where their products foreseeably reach. Fundamental fairness to the
31 Id
32 Id at 839.
33 I at 840.
34 Id
35 Id at 841.
36 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
37 Id at 212.
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consumer and the courts' interest in settling all liability in one action
would require it.
---CYRUS M. JOHNSON, JR.

